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PRISON REFORM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
I. THE ARKANSAS PRISON CASES: THE BEGINNINGS OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN PRISON REFORM
In 1970, after a sustained legal battle, prison inmates obtained an
unprecedented federal court ruling that confinement itself, under the
conditions prevailing in the Arkansas penal system, violated their con-
stitutional rights. The decision, Holt v. Sarver (Holt I),' followed
several years of litigation2 which had begun when the settled view of
most federal judges was that the administration of both state and
federal prisons was beyond the wise exercise of their jurisdiction.3
Taken together, the Arkansas prison decisions exemplify the wide-
spread awakening of federal judges in the late 1960's to the barbarity
of many American prisons, and to the conflict in their own obligations
to preserve the civil rights of prisoners while acting within the bounds
of judicial power.4
The first significant victory for the Arkansas prisoners came in
1965 in Talley v. Stephens,5 when Judge J. Smith Henley ruled that
the tradition of judicial abstention from review of prison matters could
not justify failure on his part to protect prisoners' access to his court.
Prisoners who testified about bad conditions on the farm had been
beaten; and, under a prior administration, the local state prison farm
had openly refused even to forward prisoners' petitions to the court.
Judge Henley went no further than was necessary to ensure access to the
court; he refused to make the requested ruling that whipping with a
leather strap was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
eighth amendment.6 But to protect prisoners from being punished
1. Holt v. Sarver (Holt II), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) aff'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
2. In chronological order, the Arkansas prison cases are: Talley v. Stephens, 247
F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967),
vacated and remanded, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d
1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Holt v. Sarver (Holt I), 300 F.
Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); and Holt v. Sarver (Holt II), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See also nn.24 & 28 infra.
3. Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALa L.J. 506 (1963).
4. For another chronological review of the Arkansas cases, see Note, 20 DRAKE L.
Rav. 188, 192-93 (1970); Note, 23 ALA. L. REv. 143 (1970); Note, 11 DuQ. L,
Rav. 92 (1972); Note, 36 Mo. L. Rav. 576 (1971); Note, 16 N.Y.L.F. 659 (1970).
See also Mosk, The Eighth Amendment Rediscovered, 1 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 4 (1968).
5. 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
6. Id. at 689.
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for improper reasons, he ordered specific relief: (1) that the prison
authorities formulate more precise rules delineating the behavior that
would be punished;7 (2) that the complaint of one trusty8 not be suf-
ficient to bring a prisoner to punishment; and (3) that punishment
be applied dispassionately, and never by a complainant.9 For a federal
court to become involved to this degree with the daily operation of a
prison was, at the time, a dramatic step. Within a few years, it would
appear to be only a first, cautious one.
Two years later, in Jackson v. Bishop,0 prisoners alleged that
Talley v. Stephens had not been observed, and reasserted their claim
that corporal punishment itself violates the eighth amendment. Evi-
dence that some prisoners had been tortured gave urgency to their
claims. Three cases were consolidated for trial and a panel of two dis-
trict judges reached a careful, limited decision which, in effect, ordered
prison authorities to obey the limitations on punishment set earlier, and
banned the application of some especially painful types of punishment.
Jackson was appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which was obviously
shocked by the evidence presented." Talley had not been appealed,
thus the circuit court's first introduction to conditions in the Arkansas
penal system was the record here, replete with evidence of extremely
brutal treatment of prisoners and the refusal of prison authorities to
obey the orders of a federal court. Using language that was to be cited
time and again in subsequent cases Judge, now Justice, Blackmun en-
joined the use of corporal punishment in Arkansas prisons: "We are
not convinced ... by any suggestion that the State needs this tool for
disciplinary purposes and is too poor to provide other accepted means
of prisoner regulation. Humane considerations and constitutional re-
quirements are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar
considerations ....,,2
This broad statement goes to the heart of much of the litigation
over prison conditions: most penal institutions in this nation oper-
ate on a woefully inadequate budget, which neither courts nor prison
authorities have the power to increase.' 3 Nevertheless, the ban on cor-
7. Id.
8. Trusted prisoners ("trusties') were regularly employed as armed prison guards.
Id. at 689-90.
9. Id. at 689.
10. 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated and remanded, 404 F.2d 571
(8th Cir. 1968).
11. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
12. Id. at 580.
13. E.g., Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287, 303 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (federal courts
powerless to compel localities to increase prison budgets). On the issue of inadequate
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poral punishment-though more extreme a remedy than any granted
below-did not necessitate preparation by the court of detailed orders
about how the prison was to be operated. In this sense, the Eighth
Circuit's decision was more in keeping with traditional notions about
the scope of the judicial power than were the holdings of the district
court, either here or in Talley. And, in Courtney v. Bishop,14 decided
two years after Jackson, the Eighth Circuit summarily rejected a pris-
oner's claim that conditions in the prison cells used for disciplinary
segregation violated the eighth amendment. It repeated there the com-
mon wisdom that courts should refrain from involving themselves with
the administration of prisons.
Courtney was decided largely on the basis of the plaintiff's failure
to prove his allegations.' 5 There was, however, no such failure in Holt
v. Sarver16 (Holt I), where Judge Henley made a sweeping review
of conditions throughout the Cummins prison farm and found many
instances of cruel and unusual punishment, among them severe over-
crowding in the segregation cells. Noting that a new prison was to be
completed in a year, he declined to order specific relief, confining
himself instead to making suggestions and ordering the authorities to
submit within thirty days a plan designed to alleviate the worst con-
ditions immediately.
Eight months later in a second opinion, Holt II,17 Judge Henley
issued an even longer and more scathing attack on the Arkansas prison
system. He described both the farm at Cummins and that at Tucker,
the other large prison institution in Arkansas, and held that, taken
cumulatively, conditions within the system were so brutal that they
constituted a violation of every prisoner's rights under the eighth
amendment. He noted with special concern the constant danger of
budgets, see, e.g., Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970) enforced sub
nom. Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972) (daily allotment for food,
clothing, and maintenance for prisoners in New Orleans city jail was $1.25 per day);
Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 34, 40 (M.D. Fla. 1975), rezed on other grounds,
539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane), reu'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 325 (1977) (se-
vere overcrowding in Florida prison); United States v. Wyandotte County Jail, 343 F.
Supp. 1189, 1200 (D. Kan. 1972), rev'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973) (payments by United States to local institutions for
care of federal prisoners ranges from $.90 to $20.00 per day; average is between $6.00
and $7.00 per day).
14. 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.) (Matthes, J.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969).
15. Id. at 1187-88.
16. 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
17. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971).
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death which inmates faced.' 8 Although he refused to hold that a state
may not confine prisoners unless it provides them with the opportunity
to participate in a rehabilitation program, he did rule that the absence
of any affirmative program may be unconstitutional where conditions
are otherwise degrading and destructive of the human spirit.'0
Specifically, the court ordered: that the use of inmate-trusties as
guards be curtailed and that trusties no longer be given positions of
authority over other inmates; that prisoners not be kept at night in
open barracks unprotected from attack by other inmates; and that
prisoners' food be palatable and free from contamination. The court
was uneasy about the propriety of such a detailed order, but felt com-
pelled to act.20 The authorities were ordered to report at the end of
the following month on the progress they had made and their plans
for further compliance with the court's order.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that the district court's
findings were overwhelmingly supported in the record, and that the
remedies ordered were reasonable. 2' The court noted with some satis-
faction that the state legislature had appropriated funds for new prison
buildings and for additional guards. In a brief concurring opinion,
Judge Lay argued that none of the planned improvements would allevi-
ate the psychological harm done to inmates by the Arkansas system.22
He recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction over the
case until the prisons adopted rehabilitation programs that were truly
broad and meaningful.23
Three years later, the prison system was so improved that Judge
Henley found no need to continue his jurisdiction over its operation. 24
In a long opinion which he hoped would be his last comprehensive
review of prison conditions, he described the improvements made at
Cummins and Tucker, and outlined the steps still to be taken. Never-
theless, none of the specific orders he had emphasized in Holt 11 had
been fully obeyed. Some men were still confined in barracks in num-
bers that even the Commissioner of Corrections conceded were unsafe,
18. "It is within the power of a trusty guard to murder another inmate with prac-
tical impunity, and the danger that such will be done is always clear and present. Very
recently a gate guard killed another inmate 'carelessly.' One wonders." Id. at 374.
19. Id. at 379.
20. "It would be a mistake to order too much at this time; but, in the areas just
mentioned Respondents will be required to move." Id. at 385.
21. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1971) (Van Oosterhout, J.).
,22. Id. at 309-10.
23. Id. at 310.
24. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 216 (E.D. Ark. 1973), aff'd in part, reu'd
in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
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trusties were still used as guards, and prisoners in disciplinary segre-
gation were given only tiny portions of barely edible food.25
The Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered the district court to
retain jurisdiction over the case.2 6 It reviewed in considerable detail
the continuing failure of the authorities to bring their system within
constitutional standards, and issued specific orders for relief, among
them a requirement that the authorities prepare a comprehensive re-
habilitation program to counteract the effect on inmates of horrible
living conditions. The court was displeased that the authorities had
not complied with its order in Holt 11 requiring they carefully restrict
the use of trusties as guards. It thus ordered that the employment of
trusties be ended altogether. In denying a petition for rehearing, the
Eighth Circuit indicated that its major concerns were: (1) that special
and immediate attention be given to the provision of adequate medi-
cal care for inmates, including treatment for the mentally ill; (2) that
the authorities take action to eliminate the physical abuse of prisoners
by guards; and (3) that there be an end to overcrowding in the bar-
racks..2 7
The Arkansas prison litigation has finally drawn to a close.28 In
March, 1976, Judge Henley issued a final opinion on the class actions
brought against the prisons.2 9 He found that there were continuing
constitutional violations, including conditions in disciplinary segrega-
tion, unreasonable restraints on the exercise of the Black Muslim
faith, and racial discrimination. Judge Henley was impressed, however,
with some dramatic improvements that had been made, noting espe-
cially the new medical facilities and training programs, the reduction
of overcrowding, and an end to the practice of using inmates as armed
guards. 30 But concerning guard brutality, Judge Henley indicated
25. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 201, 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1974)
(Lay, J.).
26. Id. at 214.
27. Id. at 215, 216.
28. At least the major litigation, regarding conditions in the main sections of the
prison farms, has ended. Related questions regarding the award of attorneys' fees to the
plaintiffs and conditions in disciplinary segregation in the Arkansas farms were argued
before the Supreme Court during the week of February 21, 1978. For a summary of the
oral argument, see 46 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1978).
29. Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 740 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 295 (1977) (questions on cert. limited to attorneys'
fees and constitutionality of indefinite punitive isolation, summarized in 46 U.S.L.W.
3093 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1977)). Judge Henley retained jurisdiction to hear individual
claims.
30. Even some of these improvements do not seem to have resulted directly from
the court's efforts. For some time after the 1974 Finney decision, overcrowding in the
prisons worsened as the number of defendants sentenced to prison grew larger than the
t978]
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some despair.21 He noted that within the previous year two in-
mates had been murdered by other inmates,3 2 and a third inmate had
been murdered with the connivance of prison employees.83 Neverthe-
less, he concluded that the authorities' failure to protect these inmates
did not reach constitutional dimensions. 4 He did not explain his
conclusion, although he had noted earlier in his opinion that no in-
mate had been killed by another inmate in the previous five years.8 5
Nor did he indicate whether any inmates had been killed by guards
during that time.
The Arkansas cases graphically illustrate the greatest obstacle to
effective -prison class action litigation: obtaining full compliance with
favorable court orders. Pro se complaints filed in the Eighth Circuit
eventually led to decisive court victories for Arkansas prisoners. The
conditions in which these inmates live have improved significantly,
in part through the efforts of the courts.3 6 But the prison farms remain
highly dangerous places.37 The systematic abuse of prisoners persists,
and the courts have now retreated from their attempts to intervene di-
rectly.
II. PRISONERS' DEVELOPING RIGHTS TO DECENT TREATMENT
The cycle of the Arkansas litigation was only the most dramatic
example of a shift in judicial attitudes that spread throughout the
nation during the 1960's and early 1970's. The legal procedures used
number released. Though some new housing was built, only when the trend toward in-
creasing convictions was reversed did overcrowding finally abate. Id. at 255-56. A re-
cent article seems to indicate that some armed trusties continue to stand guard in the
guard towers, in spite of the Eighth Circuit's express order, 505 F.2d at 205, and Judge
Henley's express finding, 410 F. Supp. at 264, to the contrary. See May, Prison Guards
in America: The Inside Story, COR.ECTIONS MAGAZINE, Dec., 1976, 3, 44-45. Of course,
it is impossible to tell when the pictures published with this article were taken, but they
purport to be current. Judge Henley's findings were issued on March 19, 1976. The
piece was published in December, eight months later.
31. See 410 F. Supp. at 272, regarding verbal abuse and insults to inmates. De-
spite his doubt of the efficacy of another order, Judge Henley again enjoined this prac-
tice. Id. See also id. at 266, where Judge Henley noted the "poor quality and lack of
professionalism of the lower echelons of prison employees who are in close and abrasive
contact with inmates every day."
The court noted sympathetically that many inmates are also of "low caliber." Id.
at 266. This comment ignores the fact that while prison authorities must accept those
inmates sentenced to their custody, they have an obligation to select only fully qualified
employees.
32. Id. at 257.
33. Id. at 271-72.
34. Id. at 265.
35. Id. at 257.
36. See, e.g., id. at 258-61.
37. Id. at 257, 271.
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by prisoners and the substantive rights upon which they relied are
very old ones that were merely put to new uses. In this way, prisoners
have sought, for example, decent prison conditions, adequate medical
care, the provision of rehabilitation programs, and the right to refuse
psychiatric treatment.
A. Kinds of Actions Prisoners May Bring
1. State prisoners. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
permits state prisoners to raise claims that the conditions of their con-
finement violate the Constitution.38 These claims usually assert viola-
tions of the eighth amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, and which, through the fourteenth amendment, applies
to the exercise of state authority.39 The traditional rule is that what
is cruel and unusual is to be judged by "evolving standards of de-
cency."'40
Prisoners are also protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 41 In Johnson v. Glick,42 an indicted prisoner held
38. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1974); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S.
546 (1964) (per curiam).
Federal courts are granted jurisdiction to hear these cases at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976).
39. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
40. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). A more detailed test was formulated
by Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment of the Court in Furman v. Georgia:
The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is un-
usually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if
it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to
believe thatrit serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe
punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the com-
mand of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized
punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972).
The Court's most recent extensive discussion of the eighth amendment is found
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), another death penalty case. As in Furman,
there was no opinion of the Court, for no opinion in Gregg commanded more than three
votes. In announcing the Court's judgment, Justice Stewart said that for punishment to
be Constitutionally permissible it "must not involve the unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain . . . [and] must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime." Id. at 173 (citation omitted).
The latter concept is a traditional eighth amendment test. Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973).
41. See, e.g., Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974), upholding a
prisoner's right, under either the eighth or fourteenth amendments, to claim damages
for denial of medical care.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has also been used with
great success by prisoners held in custody before trial. See text accompanying note 63
infra. Equal protection claims by prisoners already convicted, however, have not fared
well. See, e.g., Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964).
42. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Employee-Officer John
v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
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awaiting trial sued guards who had beaten him without provocation.
The Second Circuit concluded that the fourteenth amendment was a
more appropriate basis for relief than the eighth, because really at issue
here was the prisoner's right not to be deprived of liberty without
due process of law. The court found Johnson indistinguishable from
Martinez v. Mancusi,4 in which a convicted inmate's claim that au-
thorities were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs was found
to state a cause of acton.44 Whether the court in Johnson relied on
procedural or substantive due process, however, is unclear. It pointed
out that the plaintiff had not yet been convicted, so that the state lacked
authority to punish him. This comment implied that the beating
constituted a denial of procedural due process. But the court surely
did not mean that an unprovoked beating could have been imposed
legally, even after full procedural process. 45 Thus it is more likely that
the relief afforded in Johnson rested on substantive due process.
Substantive due process requires the government to show that a
compelling public interest justifies challenged government action that
has infringed on a person's fundamental personal liberties.4 This test
seems appropriate for evaluating prisoners' claims that the conditions
in which they live are intolerable. Moreover, if the deprivation of
a prisoner's rights is serious, due process permits the government to
impose only the least restrictive conditions consistent with the public
interest. Since the eighth amendment requires only that the depriva-
tion not be cruel, substantive due process theoretically supports results
more favorable to prisoners than does the eighth amendment. 47 Never-
theless, the fourteenth amendment has been invoked more often
in cases involving medical claims rather than in other kinds of prison
cases.4 8 In practice, the distinction may be irrelevant, since the standard
43. 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971). In Martinez,
a convicted inmate's claim that the authorities had been deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs was found to state a cause of action. Johnson's discussion of Martinez,
481 F.2d at 1031, is confusing, however, because Martinez itself rested on the cighth
amendment, not the fourteenth.
44. Noting that the right to medical treatment is part of the right not to be de-
prived of life without due process, the Sixth Circuit has relied on the fourteenth amend-
ment in upholding a prisoners claim for denial of medical care. Fitzke v. Shappell, 468
F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972).
45. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
46. See, e.g., Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
47. See Singer, Bringing the Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due Process and
the Eighth Amendment, 39 U. CINN. L. REv. 650 (1970).
48. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 983 (1971).
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actually applied under either amendment is usually the vague "con-
duct that shocks the conscience" test.49
State prisoners may also sue under state tort law. If the jurisdic-
tional amount is met, and if the plaintiff and the warden of his prison
are citizens of different states, the diversity jurisdicton of federal courts
may be invoked.50 Of course, state prisoners' suits usually will not
satisfy these requirements.
Finally, state prisoners may bring habeas corpus actions in federal
court.5 ' They must, however, first exhaust their remedies in state
courts.52 Only rarely do prisoners obtain early release,5 3 but habeas
corpus sometimes has provided a useful means for prisoners to gain a
hearing on their living conditions.54
2. Federal prisoners. Because section 1983 applies only to official
acts taken under color of state law, it is not available to federal pris-
oners.65 Federal prisoners rely instead largely on writs of habeas corpus
and actions for injunctions or declaratory judgments, and at least one
federal court has found that the principles to be applied in these cases
are equivalent to those applied under section 1983.56 Also, federal pris-
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033, which applies this test under
the fourteenth amendment, and Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965),
which uses the identical test under the eighth amendment.
50. United States ex rel. Fear v. Rundle, 364 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd,
506 F.2d 331 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975). Diversity jurisdic-
tion is provided at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
It should be noted that a prisoner is not necessarily domiciled in the place where
he is incarcerated. United States ex rel. Fear v. Rundle, 364 F. Supp. 53, 57 (E.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975). One
can probably assume that most state prisoners committed their crimes in the state of their
domocile, and were convicted and imprisoned there.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970) grants to federal courts jurisdiction over habeas
corpus actions brought by state prisoners.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1970); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
53. Release may be used as a threat against prison administrators: in one federal
habeas corpus action, a federal judge ordered that a seriously insane prisoner be re-
leased if arrangements for the prisoner's proper care were not made within thirty days.
United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Conn. 1973). And in one very un-
usual case, a small prison was closed after the authorities ignored repeated court orders
that it be made habitable. Apparently most of the prisoners already had been trans-
ferred to other institutions. Little v. Cherry, 3 PRISON L. RPTR. (ABA) 70 (E.D. Ark.
1974) (Henley, J.).
54. E.g., Paquette v. Norton, 3 PISON L. RiTR. (ABA) 269 (D. Conn. 1974)(suit by epileptic prisoner to obtain reassignment to a lower bunk, so that if he
fell during a seizure, his injuries would be minimized); Nason v. Superintendent Bridge-
water State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968) (review of conditions of
confinement of a man held in a mental hospital while unfit to stand trial for murder).
Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1975) (dicta).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
56. Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338, 342 (W.D. Mo. 1974). Power to
grant writs of habeas corpus to federal prisoners is given to federal courts at 28 U.S.C.
1978]
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oners may sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act.57 It is not clear
whether any other form of action is available to federal inmates in
prison conditions suits, although the Fifth Circuit has upheld one
prisoner's action interpreted by the court to have been brought under
the federal mandamus statute.58 Only one Supreme Court decision,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics,59 has recognized a direct private right of action against a federal
official who has violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights. Moreover,
it is very possible that the Supreme Court as presently constituted
would strictly limit this decision should it review a similar suit today.10
§ 2241 (1970). Prisoners' actions for declaratory judgment or injunction may be brought
in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) if the conduct of which the plaintiffs
complain violates a congressional statute that protects the plaintiffs' rights. Otherwise,
federal prisoners must rely on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (Supp. 1977), granting to fed-
eral courts jurisdiction to hear suits involving federal questions. The amount-in-contro-
versy requirement has been abolished for suits against a federal official sued in his offi-
cial capacity. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
57. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). The statute is found in Legis-
lative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C. Title 28). Federal court jurisdiction over claias against
the United States for $10,000 or less is granted at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970).
58. Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966) (action to prohibit un-
reasonable restriction on the exercise of the Black Muslim religion in federal peniten-
tiary). At 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), federal courts are given jurisdiction over this
common law action. Cf. Blair v. Anderson, 325 A.2d 94 (Del. 1974) (federal prisoner
may sue state warden for negligence in failing to prevent another inmate's attack, be-
cause the plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the United States government's con-
tract with the defendant to keep him in "safe custody").
59. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (6-3 opinion) (Burger, C.J., Black, J., and Blackmun, J.,
dissented).
60. Several of the concerns of the present Court militate against the holding of
Bivens. For example, the Burger Court is deeply worried about the vast amount of
litigation brought in the federal courts. See, e.g., Summary of oral arguments in Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 46 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. July 26, 1977) (No. 76-1836); Punta
Gorda Isles, Inc. v. Livesay, 46 U.S.L.W. 3595, 3596 (U.S. March 28, 1978) (No. 76-
1873). Thus it is not likely to encourage new rights of action. In fact, it has narrowly
construed previously established rights of action. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976).
The Seventh Circuit, however, has recently extended the scope of Bivens by hold-
ing that a state governmental entity, which is not a "person" within the meaning of §
1983, may be sued directly under the Constitution. The case may be heard in federal
court if the requisite amount is in controversy. McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 508 (1977).
Under the traditional rule, Constitutional rights are not capable of valuation, and
therefore suits to enforce these rights do not meet the jurisdictional requirement. See,
e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Pres. Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51
(D.D.C. 1973). The rule has been subjected to severe criticism and is not always liter-
ally enforced. See Comment, The Jurisdictional Amount in Controversy in Suits to En-
force Federal Rights, 54 Tax. L. REv. 545, 583-89 (1976) (written before the recent
amendment exempting federal question suits against federal officials sued in their official
capacities from the amount-in-controversy requirement, but applicable as well to federal
question suits against other defendants).
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Although the Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick failed to distin-
guish convicted prisoners from those awaiting trial,61 prisoners held
before trial are usually afforded fairly extensive protection, not avail-
able to convicted prisoners, under the fourteenth amendment's prohi-
bition against the denial of liberty without due process of law.62 Con-
ditions in many jails are equivalent to or even fall below the conditions
in prisons, and as a result, jail inmates, who are usually awaiting trial,
have often been able to make successful equal protection claims as
well.6 Because of the additional rights afforded prisoners held before
trial, jail conditions cases have resulted in the release, on bail or on
personal recognizance, of numbers of prisoners who otherwise would
be unable to secure these privileges.6
B. The Newly Recognized Right to Decent Conditions of
Confinement
Following in the wake of the Arkansas prison cases were general
attacks on the conditions in state prisons throughout the Deep South.65
61. 481 F.2d at 1031.
62. E.g., Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976) (those held awaiting trial
may not be kept in conditions more restrictive than necessary to ensure their presence
at trial); accord, O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich., 437 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.
Mich. 1977) (same); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
63. See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In-
mates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 685 (D. Mass. 1973),
aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Brenneman v.
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE
ULTiMiATE GHETTO 5 (1975) (Garden City: Anchor Press).
64. See, e.g., Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 518 F.2d 1241 (1st
Cir. 1975).
65. ALABAmA: James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974), consoli-
dated sub nom. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part, va-
cated in part, and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1977); McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859
(1975); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 503 F.2d
1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (medical care for state
prisoners); James v. Wallace, 386 F. Supp. 815 (M.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 533 F.2d 963
(5th Cir. 1976) (allegations of racial discrimination in the appointments to state
boards and commissions made by Gov. Wallace). FLORMA: Costello v. Wainwright, 397
F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1976) (en bane), rev'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 325 (1977). LouISIANA:
Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). MIssIssIPPI: Gates v. Collier, 349
F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974), enforced, 390
F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss.), motion for accelerated relief denied, 407 F. Supp. 1117
(N.D. Miss. 1975), enforced, 423 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 1241
(5th Cir. 1977); see also Gates v. Collier, 371 F. Supp. 1368 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 489
F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated per curiam, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975) (en bane),
70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (attorneys' fees). OKLAHOMA: Battle v. Anderson,
376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974), subsequent unpublished order aff'd, 564 F.2d 388
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Challenges to prison conditions elsewhere were usually somewhat more
limited in scope, but very large in number.66 In addition, suits attack-
ing jail conditions have been brought all over the country.67 This
(10th Cir. 1977). TEXAs: In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
925 (1976) (on interlocutory appeal). VIRGINIA: Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va.), 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D.
Va. 1973).
66. See, e.g., Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656 (D. Nev. 1975); Aikens v.
Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1974), aff'd in part, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.), on
remand, 390 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Aikens v. Jenkins, 534
F.2d 751 (7th Cir.), vacated sub nom. Lash v. Aikens, 425 U.S. 947, on remand, 547
F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1976) (action limited to four questions: censorship of reading
matter, access to a legal library while in disciplinary segregation, other conditions in
segregation, and procedures for disciplinary transfers in Indiana state prison); Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nom. Sostre v. Mc-
Ginnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v. Os-
wald, 404 U.S. 1049 (Douglas, J., dissenting), motion to proceed in forma pauperis
granted, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). But see Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp.
1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Taylor v. Perini, 359 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (dis-
cussion of prior, unreported litigation), rev'd and remanded, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.
1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 982 (1975), enforced, 413 F. Supp. 189 (N.D.
Ohio) (responding to first report of special master), enforced, 421 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) (special master's second report confirmed).
67. BALTIMORE: Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972); see also
Schoonfield v. Mayor and City Council, 399 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd with-
out published opinion, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir. 1976). BOSTON: Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973) (Garrity, J.), aft'd, 494
F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974), enforced, 518 F.2d 1241 (1st
Cir. 1975) (affirming district court order that bail appeal project continue to avoid
frustrating earlier ruling that only one person be put in each cell). CLEVELAND: Cain v.
Perk, 3 PRISn L. RPTR. (ABA) 293 (N.D. Ohio 1974). DALLAS: Taylor v. Ster-
rett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aft'd in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983 (1974). DETROIT: Wayne
County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Sheriff, 391 Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d 910 (1974).
EL PAso: Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1977). JACKSONVILLE, FLORIMA:
Miller v. Carson, 392 F. Supp. 515 (M.D. Fla. 1975). KANSAS CITY, KANSAS: United
States v. Wyandotte County, Kan., 343 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Kan. 1972), rev'd and
remanded per curiam, 480 F.2d 969 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI: Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
LIMA, OHIO: Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair, 376 F. Supp. 483 (N.D.
Ohio 1973), vacated and remanded, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974) (attorneys' fees for
representation of inmates in jail conditions suits). LITTLE RooK: Hamilton v. Love,
328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). MILwAUxEE: Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail
v. Petersen, 51 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1971), 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis, 1973).
MOBILE, ALABAMA: Theriault v. United States, 481 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1114 (1973). NEw ORLEANS: Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp.
1016 (E.D. La. 1970), enforced sub nom. Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.
La. 1972); See Holland v. Donaldson, 3 PRISON L. RPTR. (ABA) 288 (E.D. La.
1974). NEw YORK CITY: BRONX: Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); BROOKLYN: Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm,
520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975), on remand, 421 F. Supp. 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); MAN-
HATTAN: The Tombs: Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (pre-
liminary injunction), motion to dismiss preliminary injunction denied sub nom, Rhem
v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), relief granted, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.),
modified, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (The Tombs ordered closed); Metropolitan Cot-
(Vol. 27
PRISON REFORM
litigation has produced widespread judicial recognition of a right not
imagined a quarter-century ago-the right of every prisoner to be
confined in decent and humane surroundings. The depth of concern
felt among many of the federal judiciary is demonstrated by their
willingness to delineate in some detail the elements of the new right,
and to exercise every procedural device available to facilitate considera-
tion of prisoners' claims.
The courts have reviewed almost every aspect of prison life. Judge
Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama has ordered that prison
food be nutritious, that meals be served three times daily, that proper
dishes and flatwear be provided, and that food be kept and prepared
with due regard for sanitation.68 -So that the food service would be
adequately advised and managed, he has also directed the state prison
to hire supervisors and consultants with various degrees of specialized
training. Other courts have required that adequate heat,69 light,70
ventilation,71 fire protection, 72 and sanitation"3 be provided. The Fifth
rectional Center: United States ex rel. Woffish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (federal jail and holding center); QuEENs: Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp.
408 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), Valvano v. Malcolm, 3 PRISON L. RPTR. 273 (E.D.N.Y. July 31,
1974) (consolidated with Brooklyn case, supra); RIKERS ISLAND: Rhem v. Malcolm,
389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.) (action by prisoners transferred from The Tombs), judg-
ment amended, 396 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y.),,aff'd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d
Cir. 1975) (consolidated with Benjamin v. Malcolm, action by inmates of Rikers Island
jail who had not been transferred there from The Tombs), defendants' motion to modify
order denied, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). SEATTLE: Bolding v. Jennings, 3
PRISON L. RPTR. (ABA) 259 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (consent decree). SAN FRAN-
crsco: Brerneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Alemeda
County). ST. Louis: Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Mo. 1973). ToLEDo:
Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio), supplemental opinion, 330 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972),
enforced sub nom. Jones v. Wittenberg, 357 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ohio 1973). WAsH-
iNOTON, D.C.: Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1975); Inmates,
D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119 (D.D.C. 1976).
68. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976). See also Dearman
v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1970).
69. See, e.g., Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972). But see Smith v.
Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 381 (5th Cir. 1977).
70. See, e.g., Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. 869, 872, 876 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
Courts have also ordered that metal covers be removed from clear glass windows so
that inmates can see the outdoors. Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 554 (E.D.
La. 1972); cf. Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. at 873; Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp.
594, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
71. See, e.g., Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. 869, 876 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Rhem
v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
72. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1214 (5th Cir. 1977); Gates v. Collier,
501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 554
(E.D. La. 1972).
73. Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970), on remand, 331 F.
Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971); Murphy v. Wheaton, 381 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (N.D.
Ill. 1974); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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Circuit has at least twice upheld rulings that state building and fire
codes be observed. 74 Another court has ordered that excessive noise be
reduced. 75
In an effort to curtail violence in prisons, courts have banned
the use of trusties as guards,76 and have ordered prisoners transferred
from dormitories to individual cells. 77 Examination of incoming in-
mates is a relatively simple step toward improving inmates' safety, and
some court decisions have required it.7s Prisoners also have the right
to obtain some physical exercise. 79 Of course, on profit-making prison
farms like those once operated by Arkansas and Mississippi, lack of
exercise was hardly a problem. Perhaps it is properly classified as a
newly recognized consequence of the traditional right of prisoners to
decent medical care, but the right to obtain exercise has been raised
and discussed as one element of the right to decent conditions gen-
erally.80
Many of the abuses these court orders were intended to alleviate
resulted from the severe overcrowding that exists in many state pris-
ons. Overcrowding creates a host of collateral problems, but it is a
difficult problem for the courts to attack directly. Experts disagree
about how much space per person is needed, but where there are prison
guidelines that have been drawn in good faith, courts will generally
defer to them."' Otherwise, the standard is usually set between fifty
and eighty square feet per person.8 2
74. See the Fifth Circuit cases cited at note 72 supra. Local codes were used for
setting minimum standards for penal institutions as early as 1971 by Judge Young of
the Northern District of Ohio, who presided over protracted litigation concerning con-
ditions in the Lucas County jail in Toledo, Ohio. Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp.
707, 715, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972).
75. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 607-09, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
76. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 902-03 (N.D. Miss. 1972), afJ'd,
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. See, e.g., Valvano v. Malcolm, 3 PRisoN L. RPTRa. (ABA) 273 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
78. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 717 (N.D. Ohio 1971) aff'd
sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
79. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 545 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Rhem
v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964, 971-72 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1041
(2d Cir. 1975); Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970), on remand, 331
F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971). But see Dorrough v. Hogan, 563 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir.
1977) (per curiam), where the court of appeals published the district court's opinion
as an appendix to its per curiam affirmance of the decision. The district court held
that if conditions are otherwise adequate, a prisoner is not constitutionally entitled to
more than two exercise periods a week. 563 F.2d at 1263, 1264.
80. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 408 F.Supp. 534, 543 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
81. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485, 494.
82. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977) (adopting
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Overcrowding often cannot be alleviated without either the ex-
penditure of large sums of money or the release of prisoners before
their sentences are completed. 3 Either remedy, when directed by fed-
eral courts at state institutions, raises serious problems of federalism.
These problems were at the heart of Costello v. Wainwright,s which
considered conditions in the Florida Penitentiary where overcrowding
is so severe that many inmates live in tents borrowed from the National
Guard.8 5 Federal District Judge Scott described in detail the physical
and psychological suffering caused by overcrowding 6 and ordered the
Florida warden to reduce the prison's population to "emergency ca-
pacity. 87 The warden appealed, claiming that he could not do so
without violating Florida law, which the state governor had ordered
him to obey.88 The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the district judge's
holding, after some confusion over whether a federal court could make
such a ruling without convening a three-judge court.8 9
Other recent decisions based not on the right to humane condi-
tions but, for example, on the first and sixth amendments, have also
American Public Health Association standard of 60 square feet per cell and 75 square
feet for a person in a dormitory) ; Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v.
Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 396 (2d Cir. 1975) (50 square feet); Ambrose v. Malcolm,
414 F. Supp. 485, 492-93, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (adopting American Correctional Ass'n
standard of 75 square feet per inmate). Cf. Valvano v. Malcolm, 3 PRISON L. RPTR.
(ABA) at 274 (American Correctional Ass'n standards "do not have the force of law,
[but] they have a pervasive effect within the amorphous boundaries of federal rights.")
The standard under Section 1 (b) of the Model Act to Provide for Minimum Standards
for the Protection of Prisoners, formulated by the National Council on Crime and De-
linquency in 1972, is 50 square feet per inmate. An order setting, in effect, a require-
ment of 80 square feet per inmate was remanded by the Fifth Circuit for reconsidera-
tion. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1215 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977).
83. But see Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977), in which the dis-
trict court required the transfer of a number of prisoners to relieve overcrowding, but
did not order the premature release of any prisoners or the construction of new fa-
cilities.
84. Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 23-32, 34 (M.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 325 (1977). The Florida case began as an-attack on the medical
care provided at the prison, but the trial judge concluded that adequate health care
could not be provided until overcrowding was reduced. 539 F.2d at 550 (5th Cir.
1976).
85. 397 F. Supp. at 36.
86. Id. at 23-32, 34.
87. Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. at 35, 38-39.
88. Costello v. Wainwright, 539 F.2d at 551 n.16.
89. The full published history of this litigation is: 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla.
1975), ag'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded for en banc hearing
by 3-judge panel, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 976), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 430
U.S. 325 (3-judge panel unnecessary), enforced, 553 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirm-
ing opinion at 525 F.2d 1239).
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greatly affected the quality of prison life.90 Among the newly established
rights are the right (1) to access to a reasonably extensive law library,"'
(2) to possess and read any publications that do not interfere with the
operation of the prison,92 (3) to send and receive mail without censor-
ship, 93 (4) to receive visitors, subject only to reasonable restrictions, 4
and (5) to worship freely, within reasonable administrative restric-
tions.95
C. Development of the Traditionally Recognized Right to Medical
Care
Even at common law, prison authorities were held to a duty to
provide medical services to inmates who, being confined, would not
otherwise have access to care.96 Clearly, one of the most elemental rights
of one entering prison must be the right to obtain medical care. Due
process would appear to require that an inmate not be forced to un-
dergo unnecessary physical suffering to which he has not been sen-
tenced.
The burden of proof on the prisoner claiming he has received
inadequate treatment, however, has been very great. Until recently,
most federal courts refused even to consider inmates' claims that state
prisons provided inadequate medical care-they would hear only cases
in which an inmate could claim he had received no treatment what-
soever.97 And additional requirements were imposed. The Ninth Cir-
90. These cases are beyond the scope of this comment.
91. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
92. E.g., Aikens v. Lash, 390 F. Supp. 663, 666-76 (N.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd sub
nom. Aikens v. Jenkins, 534- F.2d 751 (7th Cir.), vacated sub nom, Lash v. Aikens, 425
U.S. 947 (1976); cf. Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974) (prisoners' corres-
pondence).
93. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974).
94. Cf. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 141 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (visiting
rights for those awaiting trial). The Southern District of New York has required that
those awaiting trial be permitted "contact visits," that is, be allowed to touch and kiss
their visitors, because this is permitted in adult New York state prisons. Rhem v.
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y.), modified on other grounds, 507 F.2d 333
(2d Cir. 1974). Most courts have refused to require that conjugal visits be allowed.
United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
95. See, e.g., Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep't of Correctional Serv., 529 F.2d
272, 275 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F.
Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aft'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 936 (1971).
96. W. LEExE, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE EMEROINO
RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED 146-47 (1972).
97. Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1970) ("obvious neglect or
intentional mistreatment").
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cuit, in 1967, denied relief to an inmate who had received only a few
pain-relieving pills, and these only occasionally, for a chronic and
painful back injury.9 8 The court found that, to recover, the prisoner
had to prove not only that he had not received any care, but also that
he had had an acute physical condition urgently requiring treatment,
and that he had suffered tangible permanent injury as a direct result
of the authorities' failure to provide him with medical care.99 In
1974, the Eighth Circuit found the standard met where the plaintiff
alleged that he had been placed in a cell with another inmate known
to have tuberculosis, that he had gotten the disease, that prison au-
thorities had denied him access to specialized treatment, and that his
sight had therefore been permanently impaired. 00
In this decade, the traditional rule has begun to erode under
evidence of the actual primitiveness of many prison facilities.1 1 In
Costello v. Wainwright, Judge Scott's holding that overcrowding in the
Florida penitentiary reached the proportions of a constitutional vio-
lation dwelt on the acute medical risks inherent in severe overcrowd-
ing, and on the inadequacy of the prison's medical resources.1 2 In
Newman v. Alabama 0 3 the medical facilities of the Alabama penal
system, which were so rudimentary as to be almost nonexistent, were
held to violate the eighth amendment. Similarly, evidence that medical
care was inadequate contributed to findings of constitutional violations
in the prisons of Arkansas, 04 Louisiana,10 5 Mississippi, 0 6 and the Vir-
gin Islands.10 7
98. See, e.g., Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420, 421 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Stiltner v. Washington, 386 U.S. 997 (1967).
99. Id. at 421 n.3.
100. Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974).
101. In the late 1960's, the President's Crime Commission found that the 358
prisons across the country employed only 306 physicians and 654 nurses and para-
medics. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE: CORRECTIONS 180, cited in R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, RIGHTS
OF THE IMPRISONED 750 (1974). The provisions for medical care made by many Ameri-
can jails in the early 1970's, and the results of that situation, are described in R. GOLD-
FARB, supra note 63, at 82-112.
102. Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975). See note 89
supra for subsequent history of the case. The District Court was eventually affirmed at
553 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1971).
103. 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Johnson, J.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
104. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 202-04 (8th Cir. 1974).
105. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1215-18 (5th Cir. 1977).
106. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
107. Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1227-28 (D.V.I. 1976).
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The somewhat less stringent standards of "deliberate indiffer-
ence" was formulated in these cases from the South, and in others.108
But this standard, as applied, has until very recently differed notably
from the traditional one only in the Southern class actions and con-
solidated claims against prison facilities in general. 100 State prisoners'
claims of individual medical mistreatment are still only rarely suc-
cessful. 110 If read literally, the newer standard is indeed difficult to
distinguish from its predecessor, except that a showing of tangible
permanent injury is no longer necessary. Nevertheless, change seems
to be slowly coming, and prisoners' medical suits brought today may
face somewhat improved prospects."'
Estelle v. Gamble,:1  the Supreme Court's first opinion on this
issue in recent times, was decided late in 1976, and its full impact is
still uncertain. The plaintiff in Estelle was a prisoner who suffered
from a back ailment. He saw doctors repeatedly; they performed some
tests on him and prescribed some medicine. His pain persisted, and
he filed a complaint pro se. The majority of the Court concluded that
since the plaintiff had seen doctors so regularly, and since the doctors
apparently made a good faith effort to treat him, their actions did not
violate the eighth amendment. The plaintiff's remedy, if the treatment
he had received was inferior, lay in an action for malpractice.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the case was a curious
one for the Court to have chosen to review, for it came up on the pro
se complaint alone, with no supporting record."13 The facts of the
108. See, e.g., Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974); Freeman v.
Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974). But see Carlisle v. Scott, 357 F. Supp. 1284
(N.D. Ill. 1973) (specific intent'to harm prisoner, on part of authorities, or severe in-
juries are necessary to make out a claim under § 1983; authorities cited, however, date
from 1964 to 1968).
109. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (class
action), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975);
Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (class action), afl'd, 553
F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977).
110. See Sturc, Conditions of Confinement: The Constitutional Limits on the Treat-
ment of Prisoners, 25 CATHOLIC U.L. R-v. 42, 83 (1975).
111. See, e.g., Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976) (individual cause
of action recognized); Wright v. Twomey, 3 PIUSON L. RPTR. (ABA) 30 (7th Cir.
1974) (The court of appeals specified, "This order is designated an 'unpublished
order' not to be cited per Circuit Rule 28."); Wilbron v. Hutto, 509 F.2d 621, 622 (8th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Cf. Shannon v. Lester, 519 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1975) (recog-
nizing individual cause of action where plaintiff was denied medical attention at time
of arrest). See also Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 21, 1978) (No. 77-121).
112. 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Marshall, J.) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 110-14 (dissenting opinion). Stevens noted that the Court may have
been interested in providing guidance on pleading .questions for lower federal courts.
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case, moreover, distinguish it from many other prisoners' medical mis-
treatment suits. Few prisoners' claims are based on such a large quan-
tum of care. Also, back maladies are notoriously difficult to cure.
Many prisoners have had clearer evidence of a real medical failure.114
The Court's holding was a narrow one: it determined only the
merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claim against his doctors, and
remanded his claim against the prison administration, as there had
been no consideration of this claim below. But language of the hold-
ing was much broader than its factual context or its specific holding.
The opinion focused on the standard of care to which prison doctors
and authorities are to be held. The 7-1 opinion may well have been
a compromise, for at different points, language susceptible to quite
different interpretations is used. The Court expressly adopted the
rule that deliberate indifference on the part of the authorities to
inmates' medical needs violates the eighth amendment. It cited cases
espousing this standard from nearly every circuit. 15 But it also wrote
that to constitute deliberate indifference, the denial or delay of medical
treatment must be intentional.116 Clearly, conduct may meet one test,
but not the other. A warden might well refuse to take the steps neces-
sary to obtain the regular services of a competent doctor, yet never in-
tentionally deny or delay an individual inmate's access to care in a
particular instance. Because of the Court's ambivalence, the lower
federal courts will be free to apply the standard they prefer.
If a prisoner must now prove, in every section 1983 medical case,
a specific malevolent intent on the part of prison authorities to deny
medical care to him personally, prisoners will only rarely be able to
recover. But some of the language used by the Court is quite favorable
to prisoners, and strongly supports prisoners' right to decent medical
care. The courts of appeals cases cited by the Court indicate that the
Court's more liberal language had already been widely applied before
Gamble was decided." 7 Thus it is the liberal sections of the Court's
opinion that are likely to be cited by the lower courts in the future."18
Id. at 115. In recent years, these courts have been inundated with pro se com-
plaints. The majority, however, merely quoted existing law regarding the liberality with
which pro se complaints are to be read. Id. at 106.
114. See, e.g., notes 97 & 99 and accompanying text supra, for claims involving
lesser degrees of medical attention. For a case involving clearer evidence of medical
failure see Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974).
115. 429 U.S. at 106 n.14. The D.C. Circuit is not included, but there are few
penal institutions within its jurisdiction.
116. Id. at 106.
117. Some of these courts have begun to apply the Court's most generous language
in new ways. E.g., Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1977).
118. But see Wester v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1977). (court uses liberal test,
but finds no mistreatment), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 21, 1978).
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But even under the broadest reading possible, the rights Gamble
recognizes are somewhat more limited than the rights that some lower
courts have been willing to accept. The case gives no hint that the
Supreme Court would be receptive to a claim that prisoners are en-
titled not only to corrective treatment, but also to the basic preventive
care normally enjoyed by most Americans outside prison. Although
no major case has granted an individual prisoner damages because he
contracted an illness that would have been prevented or alleviated if
he had had earlier access to a doctor, some courts have ordered that
a program of preventive medicine be established in prisons.11 The
standard of care set forth in Gamble provides no support for this
development.
Federal prisoners, unlike some state prisoners, are protected under
18 U.S.C. § 4042, which provides that to make out a claim, they need
only establish that they have not received "suitable" medical care.120
Though suits have seldom been brought under this statute, the medi-
cal facilities in the federal prison system have in the past been seriously
inadequate. In 1973, one angry district court judge pointed out that
until the 1976 opening of the Federal Correctional Institute at Butner,
North Carolina-then in the planning stage-the federal government
would not operate any institution capable of properly caring for a
prisoner suffering from a long-term psychiatric disorder.1 21 Despite
some administrative difficulties at Butner, vastly improved treatment
is now available at least to mentally disturbed federal prisoners.1 22
Thus the federal statute may remain only rarely used.
D. The Prospects for Development of a Right to Rehabilitative
Treatment
Until quite recently, the courts have steadfastly refused to recog-
nize the right of prisoners to participate in a rehabilitation program, 128
119. E.g., Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1228 (D.V.I. 1976).
120. Ricketts v. Ciccone, 371 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (W.D. Mo. 1974). See also
Sturc, supra note 110, at 84 nn.296 & 297. Many states have similar laws, also rarely
applied. See, for example, the statutes cited in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103-04
n.8.
121. United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377, 1377-78 (D. Conn. 1973). The
Federal Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri did not qualify as a psychiatric hos-
pital. Id. at 1379. In a similar case, the Eighth Circuit dismissed Springfield as non-
therapeutic: A "security atmosphere . . . dominate[d] over the hospital nature of the
institution." Guy v. Ciccone, 439 F.2d 400, 402 (8th Cir. 1971).
122. The Butner complex opened thirty months behind schedule, in May, 1976,
and has encountered some other operating difficulties since. Pinsky, Butner, The Jinxed
Prison, Tim NATION, July 9-16, 1977, at 41, 43.
123. Some judges have, however, attempted to encourage development of rehabili-
tative programs in prison. E.g., James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala.
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despite steady pressure from prisoners' advocates.124 There are, how-
ever, many indications that the right may soon be established, perhaps
not independently, but as an adjunct to other recognized rights.
1. Psychiatric care. It is now settled that people who are confined
in state institutions and are neither dangerous nor convicted of any
crime are entitled to care appropriate to their needs. The Supreme
Court has recognized that one who is involuntarily committed to a
mental institution after a civil proceeding has a right to be treated or
released, at least if there is no evidence that he is dangerous to him-
self or another. 125 This right had been recognized much earlier by
some lower courts.126 In Wesley v. Weaver, the Seventh Circuit re-
viewed the plight of a child who, following a court finding that she
had been neglected by her family, had been placed in a series of state
institutions. The court held that she might recover damages if she
could establish that she had been denied appropriate psychiatric treat-
ment and adequate care while in the state's custody. 27 Juveniles who
have committed criminal offenses or juvenile violations often have a
statutory right to treatment, 28 which the D.C. Circuit in particular has
been careful to enforce. 29 Prisoners held until they are fit to stand
trial are entitled to the care they need, 30 and once they are fit, they
must be returned for trial as soon as possible.' 3x
1974). James was written by Judge Johnson, a leader in exerting the power of the fed-
eral courts to demand that state officials improve conditions in state institutions. Accord,
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.) (officials given six months to remedy
inadequate facilities), enforced, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (master appointed
to set standards), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.) (court refuses to appoint
advisory committee), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (standards must
be effectuated; lack of funds is no defense), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 284 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
124. As early as the Arkansas cases, for example, prisoners sought judicial recog-
nition of a right to rehabilitation. Holt II, 309 F. Supp. at 378-79.
125. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
126. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Bazelon, J.);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Ader-
holt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507
(5th Cir. 1974) (Wisdom, J.).
127. 2 PRISON L. RPTR. (ABA) 174 (7th Cir. 1973).
128. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-1 (Burns 1973) see Nelson v. Hyne, 355
F. Supp. 458, 459 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (supplemental opinion), aff'd 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
129. See, e.g., In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Creek
v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam); United States v. Alsbrook,
336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971). See also Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D.
Ind. 1972), 355 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (supplemental opinion), both opinions
aff'd and remanded, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
130. See, e.g., Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604,
233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
131. See, e.g., Henry v. Ciccone, 440 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1971).
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In all of these cases, there are special factors not present in ordi-
nary prison cases. Civilly confined patients are held either for treat-
ment or to preserve the public safety, and when neither reason is satis-
fied, they must be released. They may not be held for punishment.
Juveniles' rights are established by statutes not applicable to adult
prisoners. Finally, those awaiting trial are presumed innocent, and
must not be confined except where necessary for the public safety or
to ensure their presence at trial. These cases, however, represent a
significant break with some past holdings, and greatly expand the re-
sponsibility of institutional officials for people committed to their
care. They appear to support a finding -that prison authorities must,
within the limits of reasonably adequate resources, develop training
and educational programs sorely needed by many inmates.
The right to receive rehabilitative care may, for some disturbed
prisoners, be an obvious concomitant of the right to receive other
needed medical care,132 though this claim has thus far been made
with surprising infrequency. While stopping short of ruling that a
prisoner has a constitutional right to beneficial psychiatric care, one
federal judge has held that once a prisoner's need for treatment has
been recognized, and he has been sent to a state hospital for care, he
may not be returned to a prison having no facilities to treat him un-
less the state can justify the transfer at a hearing. 8 In this judge's
view, once the state has undertaken to provide treatment, it may not
withdraw the treatment arbitrarily.
A right to rehabilitation for disturbed prisoners may also be
developed by a more circuitous route. Courts have noted the need
to examine incoming inmates so that more dangerous inmates may
be segregated from the rest of the prison's population.134 Testing
would seem a highly useful and relatively inexpensive way of promot-
ing safety in prison. Once prison authorities become aware of a pris-
oner's problem, they are under a greatly increased duty to alleviate
it.135 The authorities' obligation to address prisoners' problems may,
132. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
133. Burchett v. Bower, 355 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Ariz. 1973). Contra, Cruz v. Ward,
558 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g 424 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Judge Kauf-
man of the Second Circuit wrote a strong dissent).
134. Cf. Johnson, Observation: The Constitution and the Federal District Judge,
54 Tax. L. REv. 903, 913 (1976).
135. This principle has thus far been advanced in cases involving prisoners' safety
and medical treatment for physical illnesses. See, e.g., Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857,
860 (6th Cir. 1976) ("[P]rison authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to the
suffering of prisoners under their care.").
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in practice, be greatly expanded if the authorities are required initially
to identify and investigate these problems.
Exactly how recognition of a right to treatment should apply
to the incurably ill is a very difficult question. For some emotional
problems, there is no known cure. The problem has already arisen
in a case involving a defendant in a murder trial sentenced to the state
hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity.13 6 His
illness made him unwilling to cooperate in the medical treatment of
his disorder, although he was capable of developing, organizing, and
teaching in the hospital's physical fitness, handicrafts, and elementary
education programs. The court held that his participation in these
programs, though ineffective for his sickness, was all that the state
could reasonably provide, given the present level of medical under-
standing. While this holding seems justified, the court failed to in-
dicate that the state had neglected its constitutional duties during the
nine-month period when even these limited programs were halted for
lack of funds. Where medical knowledge is imperfect, it will be im-
possible to determine in advance who will respond to treatment and
who will not, but the possibility of failure alone cannot justify neglect
to extend any treatment. There are, however, some obvious potential
difficulties with broad court orders that effective therapeutic rehabili-
tative care be given all disturbed prisoners.
A useful rule for psychiatric treatment cases may be a version
of the older rule that courts will not examine the adequacy of care,
once some care has been made available. The rule is no longer strictly
applied in medical cases involving maladies readily amenable to mod-
em care, 37 but may be appropriate where the proper course of treat-
ment is widely disputed and no certain cure has been identified. The
rule should not, however, be permitted to serve, as it once did, as a
pretext by which courts can avoid reviewing care that is grossly in-
adequate by any accepted medical standard.
2. Education and job training. The day is more rapidly approach-
ing when mentally healthy prisoners will be able to claim a right to
obtain rehabilitative education and job training. The view that the
primary function of prisons should be to rehabilitate inmates has
136. Eidinoff v. Connolly, 281 F. Supp. 191, 198-200 (N.D. Tex. 1968). See also
Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (diffi-
culty of diagnosis of some mental problems), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied sub nom. Department of Human Resources v. Burnham, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975), criticized in Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d at 48 n.3.
137. See, e.g., Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976).
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been echoed by three Justices of -the Supreme Court.18 The rehabilita-
tive effects of proposed reforms have been a factor in judicial decisions
to adopt them. For example, the rehabilitative effects of fairer process
were mentioned by the Supreme Court when it required increased
procedural due process in prison disciplinary proceedings. 18 9 Of course,
believing that rehabilitation ought to be available and holding that
a prisoner has a constitutional right to obtain such assistance are quite
different. The dicta in these cases, though, indicates that many judges
may be inclined to look for a constitutional basis for a right to par-
ticipate in a rehabilitative training program.
The most likely source for development of an enforceable right to
rehabilitative treatment is the intolerable conditions that prevail in
many American penal institutions. At least five federal courts, includ-
ing the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, have required states to provide some
countervailing program where prison conditions are patently destruc-
tive of the human spirit: they have required states to take steps to
ensure that prison does not make an inmate more antisocial than he
was when he entered prison.140 Recognition of this right reflects the
interests both of society and of the individual prisoner. 41 Two of
these courts have gone much further, holding that prison officials must
also provide for all prisoners an opportunity to become rehabilitated.
138.
Imprisonment is intended to accomplish more than the temporary removal of
the offender from society in order to prevent him from committing like offenses
during the period of his incarceration. While custody denies the inmate the op-
portunity to offend, it also gives him an opportunity to improve himself and to
acquire skills and habits that will help him to participate in an open society
after his release. Within the prison community, if this basic hypothesis is cor-
rect, he has a protected right to pursue his limited rehabilitative goals, or at
the minimum, to maintain whatever attributes of dignity are associated with
his status in a tightly controlled society.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 234 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Bren-
nan and Marshall, JJ.).
139. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974).
140. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemore,
437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977); Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218 (D.V.I.
1976); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 292 (5th Cir.
1977) (the court of appeals held that the district court's order that the prison au-
thorities offer some rehabilitation programs was not constitutionally required and not to
carry precedential value, but that the court's order would not be overly burdensome to
the prison administration, and could stand); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (Holt II). But see French v. Heyne,
547 F.2d 994, 1002 (7th Cir. 1976) (conditions at Indiana State Reformatory not com-
parable to conditions in Arkansas and Alabama prisons, so there is no right to a counter-
vailing rehabilitative program).
141. Laaman v. Helgemore, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).
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Judge Young of the Virgin Islands has held that meaningful rehabili-
tation opportunities must be available to all inmates who wish to
take advantage of them.14 Judge Bownes, then of New Hampshire, has
required that each state prisoner be given the chance to learn a skill
marketable in New Hampshire.143 Judge Bownes found that "[p]un-
ishment for one crime, under conditions which spawn future crimes
and more punishment, . . . is 'so totally without penological justifi-
cation that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering' in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment."' 44 These two cases reach a goal that
many federal district courts have been approaching step by step in
recent years and which many have viewed with some longing. Now
that two courts have required the creation of rehabilitation programs
in prison where necessary to curtail recidivism, it seems likely that if
these opinions are not reversed, they will provoke significant further
support.
Nevertheless, there are cases refusing to require establishment
of a rehabilitation program for fear that judicial intervention might
create rigidity in programs that demand imagination and experimen-
tation if they are to be successful. 45 In addition, judicial power is
limited by the fact that judges lack the power to secure for individual
prisoners the best program available. Full responsibility for the place-
ment of federal prisoners is vested in the Attorney General, 46 and most
states have adopted a corresponding system. Even if the sentencing
judge-state or federal-reads into the record at trial a recommenda-
tion that a defendant undergo a particular type of treatment, the
defendant may not later challenge his assignment to an institution
having no therapeutic program whatsoever,14T despite the fact that he
might not have been incarcerated at all had the judge known where
the prisoner was to do his time. Moreover, even if a statute has ex-
pressly lengthened the term of imprisonment for a certain crime in
order that rehabilitation may be more successfully provided, a show-
ing of very superficial attempts at treatment is sufficient to sustain the
prisoner's additional confinement. 1 48 If a prisoner can prove that no
142. Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. at 1218, 1226-27 (D.V.I. 1976).
143. Laaman v. Helgemore, 437 F. Supp. 269, 316 (D.N.H. 1977).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (three-judge
panel), aff'd, 393 U.S. 266 (1968) (per curiam).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (1970); Lawrence v. Willingham, 373 F.2d 731 (10th
Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
147. See Ledesma v. United States, 445 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
148. People ex rel. Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 58 Misc. 2d 57,
295 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 24 N.Y.2d 850, 248 N.E.2d 918, 301
N.Y.S.2d 89 (1969).
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treatment whatsoever is available to him, however, he may be able to
obtain release or transfer.1 49
3. Procedural safeguards in the selection of prisoners for rehabili-
tative programs. Introduction of procedural rights into the adminis-
tration of rehabilitation programs made available after sentencing
now seems foreclosed. United States ex rel. Myers v. Sielaff,15 a well-
reasoned case that was never widely cited, held that a prisoner is en-
titled to a fair hearing, not merely a summary one, when he applies
to a community treatment program in which he would be released
from prison. The court held that a prisoner might be entitled to
punitive damages if the hearing he received had been only a sham. It
is doubtful, however, whether this case can stand after the Supreme
Court's decision in Moody v. Daggett.151 There the Court held that a
prisoner who was released on parole, committed a crime, and was
convicted and incarcerated for that crime, is not entitled to a prompt
parole revocation hearing if the parole-violator warrant, although
issued and lodged with the institution in which he is confined, has not
actually been served on him. The Court found that "the lodging of
a detainer. .. does not have the kind of impact on his custodial status
that requires a due process hearing."'15 2 This rather limited holding
has far reaching consequences, which have already been recognized.
In Solomon v. Benson,15 3 the Seventh Circuit, relying on Moody,
overruled its earlier holding 54 that procedural due process must be
afforded a prisoner in the determination that he is a special offender
not eligible for minimum security programs, such as most rehabilita-
tion programs, or for transfer or early parole.
E. The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment
A problem quite different from prisoners' usual claims of inade-
quate care has emerged when prisoners seek to avoid participation in
psychiatric programs. 155 Very few procedural rights are afforded these
149. People ex rel. Ceschini v. Warden, 30 A.D.2d 649, 291 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1st
Dep't 1968).
150. 381 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
151. 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
152. Id. at 89. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. 563 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1977).
154. Holmes v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1976).
155. The discussion which follows concerns cases very different from those in which
inmates merely contest prison requirements that they attend school. E.g., Rutherford v.
Hutto, 377 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Ark. 1974). The issue here was whether the plaintiff
could be compelled to sit through elementary education classes. The plaintiff asserted
that he had a constitutional right to remain ignorant, which the court politely dismissed.
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prisoners. One who refuses to take a psychiatric examination may be
denied good time credits although he is otherwise a model prisoner. 56
Furthermore, a prisoner may not challenge his transfer to a mental
institution for the duration of his sentence.157 A prisoner is entitled
to a hearing, however, if he is held beyond his sentence for the pur-
poses of treatment 5 Those held awaiting trial have more substantial
rights: they may not be compelled to participate in any programs
against their will. 59
Direct substantive challenges to mandatory psychiatric treatment
have received more favorable attention in the courts. Perhaps this is
because of the extreme forms of treatment at issue in these cases. In
Nelson v. Heyne,60 plaintiffs sued to enjoin the widespread use of
drugs to control the inmates of a medium security Indiana state boys'
home. The drugs were administered routinely, without specific medi-
cal orders and with no view toward treatment. Those given the drugs
were not examined for side effects although many of the drugs used
were quite powerful. The court enjoined the use of the drugs except
on the authorization of a doctor, and ordered that an inmate be given
an opportunity to take the drug orally before nurses resorted to forcible
injections. 16'
Two other cases have produced similar results. In Scott v. Plante,162
the plaintiff had been determined unfit to stand trial and committed
to a New Jersey state hospital, where he was kept for twenty years.
Among his allegations was the claim that tranquilizers had been forced
upon him though neither he nor any member of his family had con-
sented to such treatment. Holding that this claim, if proved, could
A much closer question was presented in Jackson v. McLemore, 523 F.2d 838 (8th Cir.
1975), in which the plaintiff was put in disciplinary segregation for two days and given
a suspended sentence of sixty days' segregation for refusing to answer questions in a
compulsory remedial education class. His civil rights action was dismissed.
156. United States ex rel. Weyhrauch v. Parker, 268 F. Supp. 785 (M.D. Pa.
1967). Eight months of keeplock (confinement to a cell) for refusal to take an achieve-
ment test may, however, be so disproportionate that it violates the eighth amendment,
although the requirement that the prisoner take the test is a reasonable part of the
prison's rehabilitation program. Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep't of Correctional Serv.,
529 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976).
157. Jones v. Harris, 339 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) (per curiam). See also Frost
v. Ciccone, 315 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
158. McNeil v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Davy v. Sullivan,
354 F. Supp. 1320, 1328 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (per curiam).
159. Brennenan v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 140 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
160. 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), 355 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ind. 1973)
(supplemental opinion), both opinions aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974).
161. Id. at 455.
162. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976).
19781
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
establish violation of -the first and eighth amendments, the Third
Circuit remanded the case for trial.'6 And in Souder v. McGuire,10
the Middle District of Pennsylvania concluded that a plaintiff who
complained that he had been confined in a state hospital for the crimi-
nally insane and given psychotropic drugs without his consent had
stated a cause of action.
Even more disturbing cases have reached the courts. Several
methods of psychiatric treatment available today involve the violent
reordering of the patient's personality. Their use seems highly inap-
propriate except on patients whose sole incentive to undertake them
is better health. Their use on prisoners who hope thereby to gain
earlier release from prison seems intolerable in a society that respects
the autonomy of all its citizens. One court has held that a person who
is involuntarily confined and who faces a long period of imprison-
ment is unable to make a truly free and honest decision to undergo
mind-altering surgery, especially when choosing to do so is his only
hope of early release.165 Nevertheless, two of the few prison systems
that have made some serious efforts to rehabilitate prisoners-the fed-
eral and California correctional departments-have in the past had
fairly extensive programs of this kind.166 More limited programs have
been established elsewhere.167 The federal program is now halted, re-
flecting in part the current trend away from a search for a magic cure
for crime,' 68 but the problem has not been entirely eliminated.
Thus far only limited questions regarding these methods of treat-
ment have received judicial review. A few legal challenges have been
brought against the use of aversion therapy, a form of treatment in
which severe pain or discomfort is inflicted on the patient to discour-
age him from acting in certain ways. In Knecht v. Gillman,'1 one of
163. Id. at 946-47.
164. 423 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
165. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in part at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063
(July 31, 1973).
166. The California institution in which these programs have been carried out is
described in Serril1, Profile/California, CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE Sept., 1974 at 3, 37-39.
The most disturbing federal program to face court challenge was the START pro-
gram at the Federal Medical Center in Missouri. Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp.
338 (W.D. Mo. 1974). It was initially feared by many that treatment at the new fed-
eral medical center at Butner, North Carolina would take up where this program left
off, but these fears have proved groundless. See Pinsky, supra note 122, at 43.
167. Opton, Jr., Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy is Punish-
ment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605, 635-36 (1974).
168. See, e.g., Cockerham, Behavior Modification for Child Molesters, CORREC-
TIONS MAGAZINE Jan./Feb., 1975, at 77; Pinsky, supra note 122, at 45.
169. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
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the first such cases, inmates of the Iowa Security Medical Facility who
were reported to have been tardy in rising in the morning, to have
sworn or lied, or to have exchanged cigarettes, were subjected -to in-
jections of apomorphine, a substance that induces violent vomiting for
a period of about fifteen minutes."'0 A district court dismissed the com-
plaint, finding the practice constitutionally unobjectionable, but the
Eighth Circuit held that the treatment was cruel and unusual unless
administered to an inmate who had knowingly and intelligently con-
sented to its use.171 In Mackey v. Procuniery'2 the Ninth Circuit held
that extreme forms of aversion therapy may not be administered to an
unwilling inmate. The plaintiff alleged that he had consented to being
sent to the Vacaville institution in California for shock -treatments, but
that once there, he was instead injected with succinycholine, a paralyz-
ing drug which, because it induces terror, is not intended for use on
conscious patients. The plaintiff alleged that the experience had caused
him to have recurring nightmares and anxiety. The court held that he
had stated a cause of action for damages under the first, eighth, or
fourteenth amendments.173 In Connecticut, aversion therapy involving
electric shocks was discontinued when the doctor in charge of the
program resigned in the face of a legal challenge from the American
Civil Liberties Union.17 4
Another form of behavior modification involves the use of decreas-
ing deprivations or increasing rewards for an inmate's good perform-
ance. A major challenge to the federal program, which used depriva-
tion rather than rewards, was mooted by the decision of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons to halt the program, ostensibly for lack of enough
inmates suitable for such treatment.175 Nevertheless, the court held that
the petitioners were entitled to a hearing before they could again be as-
signed to this or a similar program."76
170. Id. at 1137.
171. Id. at 1140.
172. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
173. Id. at 878.
174. Note, CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE July/Aug., 1975, at 60. The program is fully
described in Cockerham, supra note 168 at 77.
175. Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338, 341 (W.D. Mo. 1974). While the
program lasted, prisoners were confined to a restricted section of the Springfield, Mis-
souri Federal Medical Center and denied ordinary privileges, including the right to at-
tend formal religious services. After graduating from the level of greatest deprivation,
however, they were allowed to watch television. Id. at 345-46. Why the violence on
television was considered less disturbing than religious services is not clear. The ban on
attending services may have resulted from institutional security requirements or from
a desire to supervise inmates in the program for every moment of every day. Or, anom-
alies like this may indicate that the program was merely very poorly planned.
176. Id. at 348.
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Perhaps the most significant case involving extreme forms of
behavior modification is Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental
Health,7 7 an unreported but widely discussed decision of the Wayne
County, Michigan Circuit Court. A mental patient who had not re-
sponded to traditional forms of treatment agreed to undergo experi-
mental surgery in which the abnormal tissue in his brain would be
destroyed. The plaintiffs, whose interest in the case was not explained
in the published portion of the opinion, sued to enjoin the operation.
The court held that one who has been submitted to the institutional
regimen for years, and who now faces some hope of release, cannot
make an unfettered, independent decision to submit to such an opera-
tion. Though the court addressed at some length the uncertainty at-
tending the operation, it is not clear why this was directly relevant.
The court also emphasized that the operation was irreversible, and that
the state could not show a compelling need which would overcome the
patient's interest in the integrity of his thoughts and personality. The
patient himself could not agree to undergo the operation, and no one
else could consent to it on his behalf.178
The refusal of treatment cases are markedly different from the
other medical care and prison conditions cases in that individual re-
lief has been freely granted. One hopes that judgment would be as
thoughtfully considered in a class action against coercive treatments,
and that courts would not be intimidated by claims that an injunction
barring such treatments would impede correctional development. 170
For some disturbed inmates whose condition interferes with their abil-
ity to seek assistance, a class action might be the only possible source
of help.
III. PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL ACTIvIsM
Serious strains on the judicial power have been created by the
federal courts' unprecedented determination that prisoners must re-
177. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), re-
printed in part at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973). The case has received much at-
tention. See, e.g., Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning and the Prisoner's Right to Re-
fuse "Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L. REv. 155 (1975).
178. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in part at 42 U.S.L.W. at
2063 (July 31, 1973).
179. In assuming supervision of the Alabama state mental hospitals, Judge John-
son established a standing commission to "have review of all research proposals and all
rehabilitation programs, to ensure that the dignity and the human rights of the patients
are preserved." Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1972); cf. New-
man v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1977) (preferring use of single moni-
tor rather than court-appointed committee to oversee compliance with the court's order).
[Vol. 27
PRISON REFORM
ceive the decent conditions and fair treatment to which the courts have
held they are legally entitled. The problem most frequently mentioned
is the heavy ,burden imposed by the volume of prisoners' cases.' 80 This
is a general problem of crowded dockets, probably more a result of di-
versity jurisdiction than of prison cases,' 8 ' and a problem to which a
general solution must be found.
A. Judicial Management of Prison Litigation
A serious problem of management has also arisen in large-scale
prison conditions cases, and, to a lesser extent, in actions directed to
specific terms of confinement. Prison suits are very difficult to admin-
ister, and thus the courts have often assumed an active role in guiding
them through trial.1 8 2 Class actions are particularly appropriate .to jail
conditions suits because individual claims are likely to become moot,
and because it is difficult for any specific condition to be corrected
without some reformation of the whole totality of wrongs in the insti-
tution.18 Therefore, some judges have encouraged the consolidation
of individual actions into one major class suit. James v. Wallace,184 the
major case involving the Alabama prison system, was a consolidation
of a number of smaller actions. In Williams v. Edwards 85 the major
Louisiana prison case, although the Justice Department intervened only
on a racial discrimination claim, the district court asked the Department
to participate in the entire case. The Fifth Circuit noted this event
without comment on review.180 In In re Estelle,8 7 Judge Justice of
Texas effectively created a class action out of the many individual claims
pending 'before him from the Texas penitentiary. He then ordered the
Justice Department to enter the case as amicus curiae. The Depart-
ment further expanded the scope of the action, successfully moving to
add additional defendants. The defendants sought a writ of mandamus,
180. See, e.g., United States v. Wyandotte County, 343 F. Supp. 1189, 1203 (D.
Kan. 1972).
181. McCormack, The Expansion of Federal Question jurisdiction and the Pris-
oner Complaint Caseload, 1975 Wisc. L. Rav. 523, 532-33 (number of diversity suits
is fifty percent greater than number of prisoner complaints).
182. See Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanding
Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HAsv. C.R.-C.L. L. R!v. 367 (1977).
183. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
184. 382 F. Supp. 1177, 1178 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
185. 547 F.2d 1206, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing lower court proceedings).
186. Id.
187. 516 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976) (dis-
cussing lower court proceedings).
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which was refused for various reasons by the judges of the Fifth Cir-
cuit. 88 Despite a dissent by Justice Rehnquist-joined by Justice Pow-
ell and Chief Justice Burger-which noted that the propriety of the dis-
trict judge's action may now escape Supreme Court review altogether,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.Y8 9 While Justice Rehnquist im-
plied that Judge Justice's action was unprecedented and completely
unwarranted,8 0 the equanimity with which the Fifth Circuit viewed
the case may indicate -that the trial judge's orders were not without
precedent. 91 Where prisons are far from conformance with constitu-
tional standards, the number of resultant individual actions may create
an unmanageable burden on the courts. A large, single action, though
unwieldy, may be the only alternative. The Fifth Circuit, after long
experience with prison conditions cases, seems to have reached this
conclusion, and has approved an active role for trial judges in con-
solidating and supervising these suits.
B. Judicial Involvement in Prison Administration
Problems of federalism and separation of powers were for a time
most conspicuous by their absence from court review of prisoners' suits.
Though these were factors in the traditional policy of abstention, once
the federal courts decided to intervene, they did so fully. A few went to
extremes. In New York Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Rockefeller,192 the trial court placed itself in the conservative camp
by refusing to recognize a right to treatment for children held in state
institutions for the retarded. It did, however, impose requirements for
the children's safety. In fashioning a decree, it held that the power to
order an increase in the salaries of state employees so that qualified
personnel could be attracted was a necessary element of the court's
188. Id.
189. Estelle v. Justice, 426 U.S. 925 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by
Powell, J. and Burger, C.J.).
190. Id. at 929.
191. In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 521 F.2d
814 (5th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976).
192. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), consent judgment approved sub nom.
New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
193. Id. at 769. A district court order requiring an increase in pay for jail guards
was reversed as an "improper exercise of authority" by the Fifth Circuit. Smith v. Sul-
livan, 553 F.2d 373, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1977).
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equity power. 193 In Barnes v. Virgin Islands,194 Judge Young threat-
ened to impose sanctions if the two top officials of the local prison
were not removed.195 These courts did not undertake extensive analysis
of the source of their power to enforce these orders, but addressed di-
rectly and practically the emergencies presented to them.
The Supreme Court has recently directed a retreat from active
judicial interference with prison regulations that are not physically
damaging to inmates. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, "'6 it reviewed the claims of prisoners who had been prohibited
by the prison administration from forming a union to improve work-
ing conditions in prison jobs, to effectuate prison reform, and to pro-
vide a forum for the airing and settlement of prisoners' grievances. 97
The Court held that the prison authorities had the power to ,ban the
union. The majority wrote: "The District Court, we believe, got off
on the wrong foot in this case by not giving appropriate deference to
the decision of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to
the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement."'' 9 8
The Fifth Circuit heeded this admonition in Newman v. Alabama,1'
where it reviewed Judge Johnson's handling of the Alabama prison
conditions case. The court rather hesitantly approved most of Judge
Johnson's orders, but carefully noted that the order to provide all
prisoners with a meaningful jcb was -to have no precedential effect.20 0
The court also implied that the lower court's order to institute reha-
bilitation programs was justified by the inhumane conditions that had
previously prevailed in the state prisons.20 1
C. Securing Compliance with Court-Ordered Relief
One reason for the concern over judicial activism in prisoners'
rights cases is the serious problems that arise in fashioning relief. The
most able and dedicated judge faces virtually insurmountable problems
in fully enforcing a class judgment in favor of prisoners. Some diffi-
194. 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1231 (D.V.I. 1976).
195. Id. at 1231.
196. 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., for the majority; Burger, G.J., con-
curring; Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Marshall and Brennan,
JJ., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2540.
198. Id. at 2538.
199. 559 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977).
200. Id. at 292.
201. Id. at 291.
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culty results from the terms of the judgments themselves. For example,
once the court has determined that prison building conditions are un-
acceptable, local building codes are a natural source of minimum
standards in fashioning relief.202 Building codes have the virtues of
being comprehensive and of having been formulated 'by the states or
localities themselves as the acceptable standards for local dwellings. But
in some communities building codes represent an ideal standard of
safety seldom attained, even in very comfortable quarters. These
standards are far beyond -the means of the most imaginative and well-
intentioned prison administrator. A court that orders an institution
to meet such local code requirements will eventually be forced to ac-
cept as a substitute for full compliance the achievement of some less
ambitious level of decency.
Securing compliance even with more realistic judgments can be
difficult as well. Courts have faced the intransigence of many prison
authorities with some despair.2 03 Improvement in prison conditions
could not fail to improve the lot of prison guards who endure these
conditions eight hours a day,204 but prisoners' suits have been aggres-
sively defended. And there are other problems. In Arkansas, for in-
stance, fairly routine brutality by guards has thus far survived repeated
judicial efforts to suppress it.203 Few courts are willing to require
changes in personnel, although some have taken this step apparently
without any qualms.20 6
A somewhat less drastic step is the appointment of a special master
to oversee compliance with the court's orders for relief.207 The masters
and their assistants may review the operation of the institution down
to the smallest detail.208 But while these masters have presided over
the implementation of many improvements, full compliance with
court orders remains difficult to achieve. In Taylor v. Perini,20 settled
by consent decree, the master reported that the decree remained un-
fulfilled in several important respects four years after it had been en-
202. See, e.g., Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).
203. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. at 707, 712-14 (N.D. Ohio
1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
204. For recognition of the abuse to which guards may be subjected, see Collins v.
Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 268 (D. Md. 1972).
205. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
206. E.g., Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1231 (D.V.I. 1976).
207. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d at 289-90 (district court's appoint-
ment of human rights committee to monitor compliance with court's order criticized).
208. See, e.g., report of the special master, Taylor v. Perini, 421 F. Supp. 740,
746 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
209. 421 F.Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
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tered.210 Here the prison authorities were not bound, as is often the
case, to an order of the court which they had resisted to the last, but
rather, to an agreement they had reached through negotiation with
the prisoners.
Another almost insurmountable problem facing court-imposed
prison reform has been the fact that the funds with which penal insti-
tutions are operated are controlled by legislatures, not by -the courts
or the executives. Legislators' failure to appropriate funds to alleviate
inhumane prison conditions has eroded the historical reluctance of
federal courts to interfere with state penal administration.211 A federal
district court in Indiana retained jurisdiction over a suit challenging
conditions in disciplinary segregation in the state penitentiary to see
if the legislature, then in session, would appropriate the funds necessary
to improve the facilities.212 If the legislature refuses to act, however, the
courts may be thwarted. In the Toledo jail suit, the federal court decree
was used by the local sheriff in an attempt to extract more money for his
department from the recalcitrant local legislature. The court, reflecting
mournfully on the limits of democracy, was -forced to withdraw itself
from -the political skirmish.213 Corruption or excessive mismanagement
can be controlled,214 but this has been shown to be the reason for in-
adequate operating funds in very few cases.
Nevertheless, the courts have stood -by Judge, now Justice, Black-
mun's holding that the inadequacy of financial resources cannot excuse
failure to observe -the constitution.2 15 In one of the New York City jail
suits, decided before the city's financial plight became known, the dis-
trict court rather sanguinely wrote that "no one suggest[ed]" that the
city did not have the funds necessary to meet the court's order.2 16
The Second Circuit subsequently noted that it could not order the
city to raise funds or build an additional facility to relieve overcrowd-
210. Id. at 768.
211. Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d
392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
212. Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482, 495 (N.D. Ind. 1974), af'd in part, modi-
fied in part, and remanded, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976).
213. Jones v. Wittenberg, 357 F. Supp. 696, 699 (N.D. Ohio 1973). But see text
at note 227 infra for another solution.
214. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 465 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972), enforced sub nom.
Jones v. Wittenberg, 357 F. Supp. 696, 699-700 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (sheriff ordered to
apply funds allocated for deputy sheriffs and squad cars to maintenance of jail); John-
son, supra note 134, at 913 (misuse of prison funds by Alabama prison authorities).
215. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d at 580, quoted in Collins v. Schoonfield, 344
F. Supp. 257, 264 n.13 (D. Md. 1972).
216. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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ing, but reasserted that inadequate resources could not excuse the de-
privation of constitutional rights.217
E. New Solutions
To solve the dilemma, the courts may be moving slowly toward
the most extreme remedies: closing the worst penal institutions com-
pletely,218 releasing prisoners to alleviate overcrowding,219 and uphold-
ing money damages claims against prison administrators who have not
acted in good faith to protect the rights of their prisoners.220 Fifth
Circuit Judge Hill, sitting by designation in the Northern District of
Georgia, noted that the decision to operate a jail is a voluntary one
on the part of the public, not required by the constitution, and that
once a government has determined to incarcerate criminals it must
observe their constitutional rights. If it fails to do so, it may not con-
fine people.221 The Second Circuit, in remanding a jail conditions
case, remarked that courts have the power to order the release of prison-
ers presently held in unacceptable conditions. 222 The Boston jail de-
cision required that the number of people held before trial be kept to
a minimum so that overcrowding would not make jail conditions in-
tolerable. 223 These cases involved inmates not yet convicted, and there-
fore presumed innocent. But Judge Scott's order224 that Florida con-
victs must be released when necessary to maintain decent living con-
ditions now has been upheld by the Fifth Circuit.z22 Judge Hand, of
the Southern District of Alabama, applied similar reasoning in review-
ing prison conditions in that state. He had initially reserved judgment
on some questions regarding conditions in the state's prisons while
the state legislature considered making reforms.220 But after the legis-
217. D tainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d
at 399.
218. Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Inmates of Henry
County Jail v. Parham, 430 F. Supp. 304, 304 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Little v. Cherry, 3
PRIsoN L. RPTR. (ABA) 70 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
219. See text accompanying notes 223-25 infra.
220. See note 111, supra, note 231-34 infra.
221. Inmates of Henry County Jail v. Parham, 430 F. Supp. 304, 306 (N.D. Ga.
1976). A consent order entered in this case provides that the jail will meet constitu-
tional standards by Feb. 1, 1978 or it will be closed.
222. Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d
392, 399 (2d Cir. 1975).
223. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 518 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1975).
224. Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
225. 553 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (mem.).
226. McCray v. Sullivan, 399 F. Supp. 271, 276-77 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
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lature adjourned without fully resolving the problems, he ordered
the parties to utilize the limited additional resources provided by
the legislature, and added: "Suffice it to say that if the State fails to
properly discharge such duties of providing and operating its prison
facilities in a manner which no longer infringes upon the Constitu-
tional rights of the inmates it may become necessary to enjoin further
use of such facilities for the incarceration of prisoners. 227 Finally, in
one of the strongest statements yet published, the Tenth Circuit re-
recently wrote that "[i]f the State of Oklahoma wishes to hold inmates
in institutions, it must provide the funds to maintain the inmates in
a constitutionally permissible manner." 28
Some courts have also begun to look seriously at granting mone-
tary damages to prisoners who prove that prison authorities have failed
to fulfill in good faith their duty to maintain constitutionally man-
dated conditions to the best of their abilities. Under the eleventh
amendment, these payments would have to be awarded against the
prison authorities personally, and not against the state,229 though the
state could reimburse the officials if it wished. Until recently, courts
faced with the magnitude of prison problems have sought to give in-
junctive relief.230 'It may be, however, that individual damages, be-
cause they are more readily enforceable by the courts, will more effec-
tively secure compliance with newly recognized constitutional stan-
dards.
At least two recent cases have upheld claims for monetary dam-
ages in prisoners' suits. In Little v. Walker 231 the Seventh Circuit ap-
plied Estelle v. Gamble22 and held that a prisoner may recover against
his warden if he can show that the warden has been "deliberately in-
different" to the prisoner's rights. The plaintiff in Little alleged that
he had gone into disciplinary segregation to avoid work assignments
227. McCray v. Sullivan, 413 F. Supp. 444, 446 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
228. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 396 (10th Cir. 1977); accord, Detainees
of Brooklyn House of Correction for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 399 (2d Cir.
1975); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1320 (5th Cir. 1974); Padgett v. Stein, 406
F. Supp. 287, 303 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
229. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Suits may not be brought
against municipal or county governments under § 1983 because they are not "persons"
within the meaning of the statute. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973);
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
230. See Sturc, supra note 110, at 88.
231. 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March
21, 1978) (No. 77-121).
232. 429U.S. 97 (1976).
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in sections of the prison controlled by a gang that would have beaten
and raped him. While in segregation, he was subject to all the
deprivations suffered by inmates put there as punishment for infrac-
tions of prison rules, even though the plaintiff himself had not
committed any violations. The Seventh 'Circuit held that the plaintiff
could recover if he could show that he had been deliberately deprived
of his constitutional rights.23 And in Carey v. LevineM4 a federal dis-
trict judge in Maryland recently awarded judgment to a prisoner who
established that he had been put in disciplinary segregation for fifteen
days solely because he circulated and later refused to retract his ac-
count of events preceding the suicide of another prisoner, an account
he wrote in order to publicize the deficiencies in the facilities avail-
able for seriously depressed inmates. The plaintiff's story alleged that
a prison guard had been indifferent to the suicidal inmate's anguish.
The defendants who had punished the plaintiff for making this charge
were ordered to pay him five dollars and lost wages for each of the
fifteen days he spent in segregation3a5
Wardens should be granted the right to obtain a court injunction
permitting them to release prisoners they cannot adequately care for.
This right should be combined with the imposition on prison ad-
ministrators of a legal duty to protect the rights of people committed
to their custody. These officials would then be empowered to bring
their facilities within acceptable standards, and would face personal
financial penalties if they failed to do so. Both of these remedies are
drastic, but they are within the traditional equitable and legal powers
of the courts, and are therefore more readily enforceable than com-
prehensive reformation plans.2 6 In this way, these remedies are con-
siderably more conservative than the virtual assumption by some
courts of the daily operation of institutions traditionally administered
by the executive branch. Because they can be enforced, they are also
233. 552 F.2d at 197-98.
234. 435 F. Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1977).
The Indiana Court of Appeals recently awarded the widow of a prisoner who had
died in jail $50,000 in damages. She sued the sheriff in charge of the jail for negligence.
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, the trial judge issued judgment n.o.v., and the
Court of Appeals reinstated the jury's verdict. The case was remanded, and the trial
court may now either order a new trial or enter judgment for the plaintiff. Johnson v.
Bender, - Ind. App. - , 369 N.E.2d 936 (1977).
235. 435 F. Supp. at 484.
236. The legal authority of the courts to formulate these plans is a subject beyond
the scope of this comment, but it is by no means established. See Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
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considerably more likely to bring about extensive prison reform.
Nevertheless, cases granting these remedies are thus far very few, and
there will be many circumstances in which neither remedy is appro-
priate.2 7
Another potentially rich source of state prisoners' rights is state
law and regulation. Prisoners' advocates have until now largely con-
fined their efforts to .the -federal courts, relying on constitutional
standards, but many state regulations go far beyond constitutional
requirements.2 8 Many state courts could be expected to be sympa-
thetic to prisoners' claims.2 39 Resort to the state courts would not cure
problems of the proper relations between the judicial and other
branches of government, but it would avoid the recurring animosities
and legal questions raised by federal court intervention in state affairs.
It might also for the first time inform many state judges, as federal
judges have now been informed, of the conditions that prevail in the
institutions to which they sentence people.
CONCLUSION
There is no handy solution to the situation that federal courts
face in prison cases. It may be that prisons cannot be made humane.240
Perhaps overlooked in the debate over judicial activism, however, is
the fact that prisoners as well as the courts suffer when court remedies
are not fully enforceable. Now that the extensive constitutional rights
of prisoners have been delineated with some care, and now that many
of the worst abuses have been curtailed by federal court action, it may
be time for prisoners to turn to individual damage actions to secure
their rights. It may also be time to begin the work of enforcing prison-
237. For example, when there are pervasive and extremely serious constitutional
deprivations, affecting many prisoners, the award of money damages may not be an
effective remedy.
238. See, e.g., statutes cited in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103-04 n.8. There
is also extensive statutory protection for federal prisoners, the scope of which is as yet
unexplored. See United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
239. E.g., Johnson v. Bender, - Ind. App. - , 369 N.E.2d 936 (1977);
Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Sheriff, 391 Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d
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(July 31, 1973); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 355 Mass.
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ers' rights under statutes and regulations. These actions might be care-
fully and sympathetically heard in some state courts. In recent years,
federal courts have been forced by intolerable circumstances -to act be-
yond the customary bounds of their jurisdiction. While their achieve-
ments can only be applauded, the search for a better means of securing
the constitutional rights of prisoners should continue.
REBECCA P. DICK
